Hearts and Minds

In addition to all of the engineering we do, we are taking time to study other topics important to Marine officers. Every person in the class is reading a book or essay, giving a presentation on that book, and then our class adviser is leading a discussion about the topic. Some time this week, I'll be giving my presentation on counterinsurgency (COIN).

There are two basic approaches to COIN. The one you are probably most familiar with is called "Hearts and Minds", and the reasoning behind it goes something like this. An insurgency starts because a government loses control of an area. The government cannot or does not enforce laws, provide basic services, or respond to civic requests from the population. Insurgents exploit the government's lack of control and launch guerrilla-style warfare against the government in that area. The local population is happy to support the insurgents because they are fed up with the government.

The solution, then, is to restore government services to the area: ensure the area has consistent electricity, running water, medical services, and adequate law enforcement. Allow the local population to participate in their governance. Reduce corruption and the abuse of power by government officials. You will then have won their "hearts and minds", and they will assist you in fighting the insurgents in their area.

There are a few problems with this approach. The first is this: how effective will the government really be at increasing living standards for an area? Creating basic services in a place where the infrastructure wasn't that good to begin with and has since been destroyed is not an easy task. Second, it doesn't matter much if the local population feels warm fuzzies about the government if the only work they can get is planting roadside bombs at $50 a pop. Finally, the insurgents may not need the active support of the population. If they can get what they need by stealing from and threatening the local population, then again it doesn't matter if the local population feels warm fuzzies towards the government.

The other approach to COIN is called cost/benefit theory. It assigns two factors to every action taken by either the insurgents or the counter-insurgents. Every action has a cost in terms of finances expended or an undesirable reaction from the local population. Every action also has a benefit in terms of reducing the other side's ability to fight or a desirable reaction from the local population. The idea is to reduce the cost to your side while increasing the cost to the other side.

Using cost/benefit analysis doesn't mean that you ignore the infrastructure, deny aid to the local population, or deny them civic participation. It simply means that you do not give this aid unconditionally. The local population must agree to assist the government in specific ways: identifying insurgents or those who have helped them, revealing caches of weapons, etc. If they choose to assist the insurgents, they suffer consequences: arrest, denial of aid, etc.

There are problems with cost/benefit theory, too, mostly having to do with what happens when you are required to punish the local population too harshly. Eventually, you will drive the local population to actively support the other side, lose your legitimacy to rule, and be unable to deescalate the situation.

Counterinsurgency is a problem that's been around for thousands of years, and successful counterinsurgency does not require new and innovative thinking. What it does require is effective leadership and a political will to win.

If you are interested in reading more, I've published the presentation I will be giving on google documents: "On Other War: Successful Counterinsurgency".

If you are interested in seeing what happens when you punish the local population too harshly, skip on over to Michael Totten's blog post about the battle for Ramadi. Hit Ctrl+f, type in "Nineteen", and start reading.

Note: This blog post and my presentation are based on the book "On Other War: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research" by Austin Long.