Hearts and Minds

In addition to all of the engineering we do, we are taking time to study other topics important to Marine officers. Every person in the class is reading a book or essay, giving a presentation on that book, and then our class adviser is leading a discussion about the topic. Some time this week, I'll be giving my presentation on counterinsurgency (COIN).

There are two basic approaches to COIN. The one you are probably most familiar with is called "Hearts and Minds", and the reasoning behind it goes something like this. An insurgency starts because a government loses control of an area. The government cannot or does not enforce laws, provide basic services, or respond to civic requests from the population. Insurgents exploit the government's lack of control and launch guerrilla-style warfare against the government in that area. The local population is happy to support the insurgents because they are fed up with the government.

The solution, then, is to restore government services to the area: ensure the area has consistent electricity, running water, medical services, and adequate law enforcement. Allow the local population to participate in their governance. Reduce corruption and the abuse of power by government officials. You will then have won their "hearts and minds", and they will assist you in fighting the insurgents in their area.

There are a few problems with this approach. The first is this: how effective will the government really be at increasing living standards for an area? Creating basic services in a place where the infrastructure wasn't that good to begin with and has since been destroyed is not an easy task. Second, it doesn't matter much if the local population feels warm fuzzies about the government if the only work they can get is planting roadside bombs at $50 a pop. Finally, the insurgents may not need the active support of the population. If they can get what they need by stealing from and threatening the local population, then again it doesn't matter if the local population feels warm fuzzies towards the government.

The other approach to COIN is called cost/benefit theory. It assigns two factors to every action taken by either the insurgents or the counter-insurgents. Every action has a cost in terms of finances expended or an undesirable reaction from the local population. Every action also has a benefit in terms of reducing the other side's ability to fight or a desirable reaction from the local population. The idea is to reduce the cost to your side while increasing the cost to the other side.

Using cost/benefit analysis doesn't mean that you ignore the infrastructure, deny aid to the local population, or deny them civic participation. It simply means that you do not give this aid unconditionally. The local population must agree to assist the government in specific ways: identifying insurgents or those who have helped them, revealing caches of weapons, etc. If they choose to assist the insurgents, they suffer consequences: arrest, denial of aid, etc.

There are problems with cost/benefit theory, too, mostly having to do with what happens when you are required to punish the local population too harshly. Eventually, you will drive the local population to actively support the other side, lose your legitimacy to rule, and be unable to deescalate the situation.

Counterinsurgency is a problem that's been around for thousands of years, and successful counterinsurgency does not require new and innovative thinking. What it does require is effective leadership and a political will to win.

If you are interested in reading more, I've published the presentation I will be giving on google documents: "On Other War: Successful Counterinsurgency".

If you are interested in seeing what happens when you punish the local population too harshly, skip on over to Michael Totten's blog post about the battle for Ramadi. Hit Ctrl+f, type in "Nineteen", and start reading.

Note: This blog post and my presentation are based on the book "On Other War: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research" by Austin Long.

Generals and other types of officers

During your time at Officer Candidate School (the place you go where they determine if you have what it takes to lead Marines), your platoon is run by several Staff NCOs but commanded by a Captain. While you are at OCS, Captains are God. To be disrespectful to them, to say the wrong thing to them, or to do the wrong thing in front of them is the same as being disrespectful to God himself. I loved my Platoon Commander, but yes--she, too, was God.

And then, one crisp day in November, our platoon was visited by a General Officer. Understand: Captains are company-grade officers, the lowest type of commissioned officers that exist. Above them are field-grade officers, and above them are general officers. Our Platoon Commander was giving us a class in the back of our squad bay when the General came to visit us. Our Platoon Commander called us to attention: "Platoon, a-TEN-...HUH!" Eighteen female officer candidates snapped to attention as the General walked to the back of the squad bay and our Platoon Commander greeted him.

I watched her answer the General's questions about how were doing, thought about the way she'd called us to attention, and realized that she was slightly flustered. Who'd a thunk it? Captains were not God after all!

Once you graduate from OCS you go to TBS (The Basic School, where all basic officer training is done), and Captains are God once again. However, once you reach the Marine Corps operating forces, Lieutenants and Captains are company-grade officers together, and godhood is reserved for field-grade and general officers.

I've had questions about military rank structure. The quick explanation is this:

Junior Marines: Privates, Privates First Class (PFCs), and Lance Corporals - about 50% of the Marine Corps

Non-Commissioned Officers: Corporals and Sergeants - your first line of leadership for the junior Marines

Staff Non-Commissioned Officers: Staff Sergeants, Gunnery Sergeants - enlisted Marines at the platoon and company level

Company-grade Officers: Second Lieutenants, First Lieutenants, Captains - commissioned officers at the platoon and company level

Obviously, there's a lot more to it than this, but this should be enough to help you understand the dynamics of the platoon I hope to write about.

Leading Marines in the 21st Century

One year ago today I was given the right to call myself a Marine. I was going to try to think up something profound to say for the occasion. Then I came into work yesterday.

Some background. Enlisted Marines also go through engineer school; their curriculum takes about two months, ours takes three and a half. Their classes are 20-30 Marines, mostly consisting of Privates and Privates First Class with the odd Lance Corporal in the mix. They typically go to boot camp, get their 10 days boot leave, go through a month of Marine Combat Training (infantry training for non-infantry Marines), then come here. Some of them graduated from high school in June, some worked for a year or two after high school, a few worked for several years.

Marines get safety briefs before they go on leave or liberty to remind them that they are valuable to their units and to encourage them not to do things that will result in injury or brig/jail time. For special liberty periods (three- or four-day weekends, days off in the middle of the week, etc.), they will typically get more extensive or varied safety briefs. We've had many of these special liberty periods lately, and some time in the past couple months, the Marines got a brief from our Substance Abuse Control Officer (SACO). In this brief, he told them, among other things, about some new ways that Marines have been getting high lately, and added that the Marine Corps couldn't test for them.

Well, guess what? There was an inspection in the barracks this past Thursday night, and they found drug paraphernalia as well as raw materials to do exactly what the SACO told them. An entire class of 20-30 enlisted Marines was implicated. They're obviously all in a whole boatload of trouble right now, and it's an embarrassment to my company, but as someone that is not involved in the situation, I have the luxury of stepping back to ask my questions.

First of all, given the magnitude of the wrong-doing, what mix of discipline and punishment is appropriate? (The object of discipline being a modification of behavior, the object of punishment being to deter others from making the same mistake.)

More importantly, what could have been done to prevent something like this? (Aside from the obvious: don't give them "safety briefs" telling them new ways to get high. But they can come up with this stuff on their own, too.) It's likely that this was started by two or three Marines that drew the rest of the class in. All it would have taken to severely limit or completely shut them down would have been one Marine that had the courage to tell them they were wrong and to report them if they didn't stop.
Where did we fail the Marines? Moral leadership is part of our profession; where was that breakdown? Additional safety briefs likely wouldn't have made a difference, but on some level they didn't receive the moral leadership they needed. Given the circumstances of how and when they get here, it's possible that there's nothing we could have done to prevent this. But if there was, what signs did we miss that indicated that something needed to be done?

It's unlikely I'll run into a problem of this magnitude in the operating forces, as regular platoons have NCO leadership to stem problems like this. But I've heard multiple other first-hand stories with similar wrong-doing and implications. How can I impress upon my Marines the importance of upright character and moral courage?
This is the heart of what it means to lead Marines: asking what are my Marines' deficiencies? Professional? Physical? Moral? Then helping them become better Marines, better people.

Yesterday, as I was walking out of class, a bunch of Marines were lined up in the hall, waiting to talk to the First Sergeant. They knew that I knew why they were there, but one of them didn't forget that she was a Marine: she gave me the proper greeting of the day as I passed.

They make mistakes, but they're still Marines, and they're still our Marines. Hopefully the rest of them will remember that, too.

Welcome!

I've never really seen the point in getting a blog before, but with the impending deployment, I knew I wanted one place where I could keep all of my family and friends informed on how it was going instead of having a giant e-mail list. I also had a chance to follow Lt G's blog, Kaboom, before it got yanked, (maybe that's another post to explain...) and was hoping to provide the same sort of experience for people who read this blog. Lt G led an Army platoon in Iraq a couple of years ago and had a way of making the most mundane stories about patrolling and working in his AO seem interesting. I happen to fancy myself a writer, so maybe if I work hard I can make the mundane things about the Marine Corps and Afganistan seem interesting.

I'm hoping that I'll have the ability to post after I deploy, but I don't actually know if that will be the case. At a minimum, it will require semi-regular internet access and approval from my chain of command.

I haven't really done much yet to get ready for the deployment except that I finally got to meet my Marines this past weekend. (Yay!!!) I have an awesome platoon, awesome NCOs, and an awesome platoon sergeant. I'm really looking forward to the chance to lead them in Afghanistan next year. I have a tentative schedule, and it goes something like this: graduate from Engineer School in late February, go to Mojave Viper to train with the platoon, and continue training with them for a couple of months before we deploy.

I think that's enough for a first post. I'll try to keep this blog up to date as I finish school and train for deployment.