My first non-Marine Corps related post. A former professor of mine died this morning after a year-long battle with lymphoma. He was well-loved among the students at Mudd and had a large impact on many students. I still remember one evening when I was a freshman struggling with my math class and he spent a full hour with me, going over the material until I understood it. I'm sure he had plenty else to do that evening, and I might have even caught him right before he was about to leave. But I was very thankful that he was willing to invest that time in me, and any other student--senior to freshman--that asked.
Rest in Peace, Professor Moody.
HMC article.
21 January 2010
14 January 2010
Ordnance
I received a question regarding my previous post asking if we knew what the ordnance looked like beforehand, or if we were looking for pressure plates. For this particular scenario, we were looking for a pressure plate because we knew there would be wires that would lead us back to the ordnance (which would be partially buried and thus difficult to find).
We didn't know exactly which ordnance we would find in this scenario, but we had a week or two of ordnance identification training before we did this ordnance reduction class. That class went something like this: we'd get there in the morning, and the Gunny would have ten pieces of ordnance lying out on the table. We'd walk around the room, classifying every piece of ordnance on the tables, and identifying the fuze, which you need to know to know which types of safeties to associate with the round. Once everyone was done, we'd go over the ordnance, talk about the characteristics of each piece, and what characteristics would make us give it the classification it had.
After a few days of that, we moved into the classroom, where we'd be given a picture of a piece of ordnance and have to find it in a computer program. Then we had to find the physical ordnance in the computer program. Once we'd completed each of those steps, then we started trying to identify the ordnance by looking at it via a low-quality camera mounted on a robot. Crawl, walk, run--the Marine Corps' favorite teaching method, and fairly effective.
I've opened comments up so that you don't need an account anywhere to leave a comment, so I hope that will facilitate more questions and comments. If you can, though, please leave me some way to identify who you are--your full name certainly isn't necessary due to privacy concerns, but a first name or first name/last initial would help. I'm 100% more likely to answer a question from someone I know than from some random person on the web that I've never met before. Thanks!
We didn't know exactly which ordnance we would find in this scenario, but we had a week or two of ordnance identification training before we did this ordnance reduction class. That class went something like this: we'd get there in the morning, and the Gunny would have ten pieces of ordnance lying out on the table. We'd walk around the room, classifying every piece of ordnance on the tables, and identifying the fuze, which you need to know to know which types of safeties to associate with the round. Once everyone was done, we'd go over the ordnance, talk about the characteristics of each piece, and what characteristics would make us give it the classification it had.
After a few days of that, we moved into the classroom, where we'd be given a picture of a piece of ordnance and have to find it in a computer program. Then we had to find the physical ordnance in the computer program. Once we'd completed each of those steps, then we started trying to identify the ordnance by looking at it via a low-quality camera mounted on a robot. Crawl, walk, run--the Marine Corps' favorite teaching method, and fairly effective.
I've opened comments up so that you don't need an account anywhere to leave a comment, so I hope that will facilitate more questions and comments. If you can, though, please leave me some way to identify who you are--your full name certainly isn't necessary due to privacy concerns, but a first name or first name/last initial would help. I'm 100% more likely to answer a question from someone I know than from some random person on the web that I've never met before. Thanks!
10 January 2010
Boring is Good
Between Friday at 1600 and Saturday at 0800, I got to stand duty as Area Officer of the Day (AOOD) here at Courthouse Bay. The AOOD represents the Commanding Officer in his absence, ensures the security and good order and discipline of the school, and handles emergencies and problems that come up overnight. The AOOD has two assistants--a Duty NCO, and a Duty Driver. Both times that I have stood AOOD, my DNCO has been a Sergeant that has stood duty before. The Duty Driver is typically a Pvt or PFC that has not stood duty before. The Duty Driver has a van checked out and can drive anywhere on base (i.e. the base hospital) if the need should arise.
Officers that stand duty are expected to roll right into work the next day, so I prefer to stand duty on Friday or Saturday to give myself some time to recover. The post is a sleeping post, so we are not required to be awake the entire night, as long as rounds are completed. The "rounds" are two tours of the area before midnight and two tours after midnight, checking on specific buildings and locations. We also stop in the barracks to check on the Junior Marines standing duty there.
Bored yet? Yeah, me, too, but boring is good. It means that I'm not dealing with Marines that fall in the shower and split their heads open, Marines that get drunk and get into serious trouble in the civilian world, Marines that pull fire extinguishers out of the wall and spray them everywhere...you get the picture.
The fire extinguisher incident actually happened earlier this week, while someone else from my class was on duty. As punishment, the whole company ended up standing firewatch at the barracks, meaning that for the past few days, they've had six Marines walking up and down the walkways outside the barracks for two hours at a time. It's not exactly a fun post to stand, particularly because it's been in the high 20s/low 30s at night recently. At some point at TBS, I remember being told that the best time to talk to a Marine is when he's on post in the middle of the night, so during one of my rounds last night I stopped to talk to some of them.
They were understandably unhappy about standing firewatch, especially because they weren't even from the same class as the knucklehead that pulled the fire extinguishers out. They were in good spirits, though, mostly because I caught them right as they were finishing their shift, and getting ready to head back inside to their warm beds.
The most exciting thing I did all night long was take the bolt cutters over to the barracks and let a Marine cut the lock off his wall locker. Given the potential alternatives, I'll take it.
Officers that stand duty are expected to roll right into work the next day, so I prefer to stand duty on Friday or Saturday to give myself some time to recover. The post is a sleeping post, so we are not required to be awake the entire night, as long as rounds are completed. The "rounds" are two tours of the area before midnight and two tours after midnight, checking on specific buildings and locations. We also stop in the barracks to check on the Junior Marines standing duty there.
Bored yet? Yeah, me, too, but boring is good. It means that I'm not dealing with Marines that fall in the shower and split their heads open, Marines that get drunk and get into serious trouble in the civilian world, Marines that pull fire extinguishers out of the wall and spray them everywhere...you get the picture.
The fire extinguisher incident actually happened earlier this week, while someone else from my class was on duty. As punishment, the whole company ended up standing firewatch at the barracks, meaning that for the past few days, they've had six Marines walking up and down the walkways outside the barracks for two hours at a time. It's not exactly a fun post to stand, particularly because it's been in the high 20s/low 30s at night recently. At some point at TBS, I remember being told that the best time to talk to a Marine is when he's on post in the middle of the night, so during one of my rounds last night I stopped to talk to some of them.
They were understandably unhappy about standing firewatch, especially because they weren't even from the same class as the knucklehead that pulled the fire extinguishers out. They were in good spirits, though, mostly because I caught them right as they were finishing their shift, and getting ready to head back inside to their warm beds.
The most exciting thing I did all night long was take the bolt cutters over to the barracks and let a Marine cut the lock off his wall locker. Given the potential alternatives, I'll take it.
06 January 2010
Special Trust and Confidence
One of the privileges of being an officer is promoting Marines and recognizing Marines for their accomplishments. This morning, one of the Gunnery Sergeants that's an advisor for one of the enlisted classes asked if anyone in the class would volunteer to do a promotion ceremony today. I eagerly volunteered, and was looking forward to it, but it fell through. So I'll just have to tell you about the other promotion ceremonies I've done.
Only an officer of senior rank can promote a Marine. Authorization for the promotion comes from higher up; for the promotion ceremonies I've done, promoting Privates to Privates First Class, our Company Commander, a Major, is the promotion authority. My function is to represent him in the ceremony. If circumstances prevent a commissioned officer from performing the ceremony, I've been told that Staff NCOs can substitute. But since they have plenty of commissioned officers here at the schoolhouse, we get to do it.
The first promotion ceremony I did, I was quite nervous, because I didn't want to mess up the Marines' promotion. Fortunately, the Staff NCOs here are accustomed to new Lts doing the ceremonies, and the Gunny coached me through it. The Gunny formed the platoon and called them to attention. I marched to the front of the formation, and the Gunny saluted and reported the platoon to me: "Good afternoon, ma'am. BCE-X is formed and ready for promotion."
I saluted back and said something appropriate that I don't remember, probably something like "Very Well."
The Gunny took his post and read the promotion warrant. "To all who shall see these presents, greetings. Know ye, that reposing special trust and confidence in the fidelity and abilities of ..." [Here, the Gunny read the names of all the Marines to be promoted; there were seven in my first ceremony.] "...I do appoint this Marine a Private First Class in the United States Marine Corps, to rank as such from the first day of November, two thousand and nine.
"This appointee will therefore carefully and diligently discharge the duties of the grade to which appointed by doing and performing all manner of things thereunto pertaining. And I do strictly charge and require all personnel of lesser grade to render obedience to appropriate orders. And this appointee is to observe and follow such orders and directions as may given from time to time by superiors acting according to the rules and articles governing the discipline of the armed forces of the United States of America.
"Given under my hand at Marine Corps Engineer School, this first day of November, in the year of our Lord two thousand nine. [CO's name], Major, USMC Commanding."
The seven Privates were standing at attention in a line in front of the rest of the platoon. The Gunny and I stepped over to the one on the far left. He was holding his chevrons in his hand (chevrons are the pins that indicate what rank an enlisted Marine holds). We each pinned one on, then the Gunny handed me the new Private First Class' certificate. I gave it to him, shook his hand, and congratulated him. We went down the line, pinning on each new PFC and giving him his certificate.
Once all seven had been pinned on, I stepped back in front of the platoon, and called the Gunny up:
"Gunnery Sergeant, front and center!"
The Gunny marched up in front of me.
"Gunnery Sergeant, take charge of the platoon, and carry out the plan of the day."
The Gunny saluted. "Aye, aye, ma'am."
I saluted back, then left-faced and marched off.
In a promotion ceremony for an NCO or an officer, the oath of office will be re-administered, and the CO and/or the Marine will address the Marines assembled. It's also common for someone important to pin the Marine's new rank on.
Rank is important to Marines. It awards both responsibility and privilege, is not given lightly, and can be revoked for poor performance or behavior. (This is not a joke. In my single year in the Marine Corps, I have met more than one Marine that has been reduced in rank.) It was my privilege to award these Marines their first promotion, and I look forward to the promotions I will get to do for my Marines in the years ahead.
Only an officer of senior rank can promote a Marine. Authorization for the promotion comes from higher up; for the promotion ceremonies I've done, promoting Privates to Privates First Class, our Company Commander, a Major, is the promotion authority. My function is to represent him in the ceremony. If circumstances prevent a commissioned officer from performing the ceremony, I've been told that Staff NCOs can substitute. But since they have plenty of commissioned officers here at the schoolhouse, we get to do it.
The first promotion ceremony I did, I was quite nervous, because I didn't want to mess up the Marines' promotion. Fortunately, the Staff NCOs here are accustomed to new Lts doing the ceremonies, and the Gunny coached me through it. The Gunny formed the platoon and called them to attention. I marched to the front of the formation, and the Gunny saluted and reported the platoon to me: "Good afternoon, ma'am. BCE-X is formed and ready for promotion."
I saluted back and said something appropriate that I don't remember, probably something like "Very Well."
The Gunny took his post and read the promotion warrant. "To all who shall see these presents, greetings. Know ye, that reposing special trust and confidence in the fidelity and abilities of ..." [Here, the Gunny read the names of all the Marines to be promoted; there were seven in my first ceremony.] "...I do appoint this Marine a Private First Class in the United States Marine Corps, to rank as such from the first day of November, two thousand and nine.
"This appointee will therefore carefully and diligently discharge the duties of the grade to which appointed by doing and performing all manner of things thereunto pertaining. And I do strictly charge and require all personnel of lesser grade to render obedience to appropriate orders. And this appointee is to observe and follow such orders and directions as may given from time to time by superiors acting according to the rules and articles governing the discipline of the armed forces of the United States of America.
"Given under my hand at Marine Corps Engineer School, this first day of November, in the year of our Lord two thousand nine. [CO's name], Major, USMC Commanding."
The seven Privates were standing at attention in a line in front of the rest of the platoon. The Gunny and I stepped over to the one on the far left. He was holding his chevrons in his hand (chevrons are the pins that indicate what rank an enlisted Marine holds). We each pinned one on, then the Gunny handed me the new Private First Class' certificate. I gave it to him, shook his hand, and congratulated him. We went down the line, pinning on each new PFC and giving him his certificate.
Once all seven had been pinned on, I stepped back in front of the platoon, and called the Gunny up:
"Gunnery Sergeant, front and center!"
The Gunny marched up in front of me.
"Gunnery Sergeant, take charge of the platoon, and carry out the plan of the day."
The Gunny saluted. "Aye, aye, ma'am."
I saluted back, then left-faced and marched off.
In a promotion ceremony for an NCO or an officer, the oath of office will be re-administered, and the CO and/or the Marine will address the Marines assembled. It's also common for someone important to pin the Marine's new rank on.
Rank is important to Marines. It awards both responsibility and privilege, is not given lightly, and can be revoked for poor performance or behavior. (This is not a joke. In my single year in the Marine Corps, I have met more than one Marine that has been reduced in rank.) It was my privilege to award these Marines their first promotion, and I look forward to the promotions I will get to do for my Marines in the years ahead.
20 December 2009
Hearts and Minds
In addition to all of the engineering we do, we are taking time to study other topics important to Marine officers. Every person in the class is reading a book or essay, giving a presentation on that book, and then our class adviser is leading a discussion about the topic. Some time this week, I'll be giving my presentation on counterinsurgency (COIN).
There are two basic approaches to COIN. The one you are probably most familiar with is called "Hearts and Minds", and the reasoning behind it goes something like this. An insurgency starts because a government loses control of an area. The government cannot or does not enforce laws, provide basic services, or respond to civic requests from the population. Insurgents exploit the government's lack of control and launch guerrilla-style warfare against the government in that area. The local population is happy to support the insurgents because they are fed up with the government.
The solution, then, is to restore government services to the area: ensure the area has consistent electricity, running water, medical services, and adequate law enforcement. Allow the local population to participate in their governance. Reduce corruption and the abuse of power by government officials. You will then have won their "hearts and minds", and they will assist you in fighting the insurgents in their area.
There are a few problems with this approach. The first is this: how effective will the government really be at increasing living standards for an area? Creating basic services in a place where the infrastructure wasn't that good to begin with and has since been destroyed is not an easy task. Second, it doesn't matter much if the local population feels warm fuzzies about the government if the only work they can get is planting roadside bombs at $50 a pop. Finally, the insurgents may not need the active support of the population. If they can get what they need by stealing from and threatening the local population, then again it doesn't matter if the local population feels warm fuzzies towards the government.
The other approach to COIN is called cost/benefit theory. It assigns two factors to every action taken by either the insurgents or the counter-insurgents. Every action has a cost in terms of finances expended or an undesirable reaction from the local population. Every action also has a benefit in terms of reducing the other side's ability to fight or a desirable reaction from the local population. The idea is to reduce the cost to your side while increasing the cost to the other side.
Using cost/benefit analysis doesn't mean that you ignore the infrastructure, deny aid to the local population, or deny them civic participation. It simply means that you do not give this aid unconditionally. The local population must agree to assist the government in specific ways: identifying insurgents or those who have helped them, revealing caches of weapons, etc. If they choose to assist the insurgents, they suffer consequences: arrest, denial of aid, etc.
There are problems with cost/benefit theory, too, mostly having to do with what happens when you are required to punish the local population too harshly. Eventually, you will drive the local population to actively support the other side, lose your legitimacy to rule, and be unable to deescalate the situation.
Counterinsurgency is a problem that's been around for thousands of years, and successful counterinsurgency does not require new and innovative thinking. What it does require is effective leadership and a political will to win.
If you are interested in reading more, I've published the presentation I will be giving on google documents: "On Other War: Successful Counterinsurgency".
If you are interested in seeing what happens when you punish the local population too harshly, skip on over to Michael Totten's blog post about the battle for Ramadi. Hit Ctrl+f, type in "Nineteen", and start reading.
Note: This blog post and my presentation are based on the book "On Other War: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research" by Austin Long.
There are two basic approaches to COIN. The one you are probably most familiar with is called "Hearts and Minds", and the reasoning behind it goes something like this. An insurgency starts because a government loses control of an area. The government cannot or does not enforce laws, provide basic services, or respond to civic requests from the population. Insurgents exploit the government's lack of control and launch guerrilla-style warfare against the government in that area. The local population is happy to support the insurgents because they are fed up with the government.
The solution, then, is to restore government services to the area: ensure the area has consistent electricity, running water, medical services, and adequate law enforcement. Allow the local population to participate in their governance. Reduce corruption and the abuse of power by government officials. You will then have won their "hearts and minds", and they will assist you in fighting the insurgents in their area.
There are a few problems with this approach. The first is this: how effective will the government really be at increasing living standards for an area? Creating basic services in a place where the infrastructure wasn't that good to begin with and has since been destroyed is not an easy task. Second, it doesn't matter much if the local population feels warm fuzzies about the government if the only work they can get is planting roadside bombs at $50 a pop. Finally, the insurgents may not need the active support of the population. If they can get what they need by stealing from and threatening the local population, then again it doesn't matter if the local population feels warm fuzzies towards the government.
The other approach to COIN is called cost/benefit theory. It assigns two factors to every action taken by either the insurgents or the counter-insurgents. Every action has a cost in terms of finances expended or an undesirable reaction from the local population. Every action also has a benefit in terms of reducing the other side's ability to fight or a desirable reaction from the local population. The idea is to reduce the cost to your side while increasing the cost to the other side.
Using cost/benefit analysis doesn't mean that you ignore the infrastructure, deny aid to the local population, or deny them civic participation. It simply means that you do not give this aid unconditionally. The local population must agree to assist the government in specific ways: identifying insurgents or those who have helped them, revealing caches of weapons, etc. If they choose to assist the insurgents, they suffer consequences: arrest, denial of aid, etc.
There are problems with cost/benefit theory, too, mostly having to do with what happens when you are required to punish the local population too harshly. Eventually, you will drive the local population to actively support the other side, lose your legitimacy to rule, and be unable to deescalate the situation.
Counterinsurgency is a problem that's been around for thousands of years, and successful counterinsurgency does not require new and innovative thinking. What it does require is effective leadership and a political will to win.
If you are interested in reading more, I've published the presentation I will be giving on google documents: "On Other War: Successful Counterinsurgency".
If you are interested in seeing what happens when you punish the local population too harshly, skip on over to Michael Totten's blog post about the battle for Ramadi. Hit Ctrl+f, type in "Nineteen", and start reading.
Note: This blog post and my presentation are based on the book "On Other War: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research" by Austin Long.
17 December 2009
Generals and other types of officers
During your time at Officer Candidate School (the place you go where they determine if you have what it takes to lead Marines), your platoon is run by several Staff NCOs but commanded by a Captain. While you are at OCS, Captains are God. To be disrespectful to them, to say the wrong thing to them, or to do the wrong thing in front of them is the same as being disrespectful to God himself. I loved my Platoon Commander, but yes--she, too, was God.
And then, one crisp day in November, our platoon was visited by a General Officer. Understand: Captains are company-grade officers, the lowest type of commissioned officers that exist. Above them are field-grade officers, and above them are general officers. Our Platoon Commander was giving us a class in the back of our squad bay when the General came to visit us. Our Platoon Commander called us to attention: "Platoon, a-TEN-...HUH!" Eighteen female officer candidates snapped to attention as the General walked to the back of the squad bay and our Platoon Commander greeted him.
I watched her answer the General's questions about how were doing, thought about the way she'd called us to attention, and realized that she was slightly flustered. Who'd a thunk it? Captains were not God after all!
Once you graduate from OCS you go to TBS (The Basic School, where all basic officer training is done), and Captains are God once again. However, once you reach the Marine Corps operating forces, Lieutenants and Captains are company-grade officers together, and godhood is reserved for field-grade and general officers.
I've had questions about military rank structure. The quick explanation is this:
Junior Marines: Privates, Privates First Class (PFCs), and Lance Corporals - about 50% of the Marine Corps
Non-Commissioned Officers: Corporals and Sergeants - your first line of leadership for the junior Marines
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers: Staff Sergeants, Gunnery Sergeants - enlisted Marines at the platoon and company level
Company-grade Officers: Second Lieutenants, First Lieutenants, Captains - commissioned officers at the platoon and company level
Obviously, there's a lot more to it than this, but this should be enough to help you understand the dynamics of the platoon I hope to write about.
And then, one crisp day in November, our platoon was visited by a General Officer. Understand: Captains are company-grade officers, the lowest type of commissioned officers that exist. Above them are field-grade officers, and above them are general officers. Our Platoon Commander was giving us a class in the back of our squad bay when the General came to visit us. Our Platoon Commander called us to attention: "Platoon, a-TEN-...HUH!" Eighteen female officer candidates snapped to attention as the General walked to the back of the squad bay and our Platoon Commander greeted him.
I watched her answer the General's questions about how were doing, thought about the way she'd called us to attention, and realized that she was slightly flustered. Who'd a thunk it? Captains were not God after all!
Once you graduate from OCS you go to TBS (The Basic School, where all basic officer training is done), and Captains are God once again. However, once you reach the Marine Corps operating forces, Lieutenants and Captains are company-grade officers together, and godhood is reserved for field-grade and general officers.
I've had questions about military rank structure. The quick explanation is this:
Junior Marines: Privates, Privates First Class (PFCs), and Lance Corporals - about 50% of the Marine Corps
Non-Commissioned Officers: Corporals and Sergeants - your first line of leadership for the junior Marines
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers: Staff Sergeants, Gunnery Sergeants - enlisted Marines at the platoon and company level
Company-grade Officers: Second Lieutenants, First Lieutenants, Captains - commissioned officers at the platoon and company level
Obviously, there's a lot more to it than this, but this should be enough to help you understand the dynamics of the platoon I hope to write about.
12 December 2009
Leading Marines in the 21st Century
One year ago today I was given the right to call myself a Marine. I was going to try to think up something profound to say for the occasion. Then I came into work yesterday.
Some background. Enlisted Marines also go through engineer school; their curriculum takes about two months, ours takes three and a half. Their classes are 20-30 Marines, mostly consisting of Privates and Privates First Class with the odd Lance Corporal in the mix. They typically go to boot camp, get their 10 days boot leave, go through a month of Marine Combat Training (infantry training for non-infantry Marines), then come here. Some of them graduated from high school in June, some worked for a year or two after high school, a few worked for several years.
Marines get safety briefs before they go on leave or liberty to remind them that they are valuable to their units and to encourage them not to do things that will result in injury or brig/jail time. For special liberty periods (three- or four-day weekends, days off in the middle of the week, etc.), they will typically get more extensive or varied safety briefs. We've had many of these special liberty periods lately, and some time in the past couple months, the Marines got a brief from our Substance Abuse Control Officer (SACO). In this brief, he told them, among other things, about some new ways that Marines have been getting high lately, and added that the Marine Corps couldn't test for them.
Well, guess what? There was an inspection in the barracks this past Thursday night, and they found drug paraphernalia as well as raw materials to do exactly what the SACO told them. An entire class of 20-30 enlisted Marines was implicated. They're obviously all in a whole boatload of trouble right now, and it's an embarrassment to my company, but as someone that is not involved in the situation, I have the luxury of stepping back to ask my questions.
First of all, given the magnitude of the wrong-doing, what mix of discipline and punishment is appropriate? (The object of discipline being a modification of behavior, the object of punishment being to deter others from making the same mistake.)
More importantly, what could have been done to prevent something like this? (Aside from the obvious: don't give them "safety briefs" telling them new ways to get high. But they can come up with this stuff on their own, too.) It's likely that this was started by two or three Marines that drew the rest of the class in. All it would have taken to severely limit or completely shut them down would have been one Marine that had the courage to tell them they were wrong and to report them if they didn't stop.
Where did we fail the Marines? Moral leadership is part of our profession; where was that breakdown? Additional safety briefs likely wouldn't have made a difference, but on some level they didn't receive the moral leadership they needed. Given the circumstances of how and when they get here, it's possible that there's nothing we could have done to prevent this. But if there was, what signs did we miss that indicated that something needed to be done?
It's unlikely I'll run into a problem of this magnitude in the operating forces, as regular platoons have NCO leadership to stem problems like this. But I've heard multiple other first-hand stories with similar wrong-doing and implications. How can I impress upon my Marines the importance of upright character and moral courage?
This is the heart of what it means to lead Marines: asking what are my Marines' deficiencies? Professional? Physical? Moral? Then helping them become better Marines, better people.
Yesterday, as I was walking out of class, a bunch of Marines were lined up in the hall, waiting to talk to the First Sergeant. They knew that I knew why they were there, but one of them didn't forget that she was a Marine: she gave me the proper greeting of the day as I passed.
They make mistakes, but they're still Marines, and they're still our Marines. Hopefully the rest of them will remember that, too.
Some background. Enlisted Marines also go through engineer school; their curriculum takes about two months, ours takes three and a half. Their classes are 20-30 Marines, mostly consisting of Privates and Privates First Class with the odd Lance Corporal in the mix. They typically go to boot camp, get their 10 days boot leave, go through a month of Marine Combat Training (infantry training for non-infantry Marines), then come here. Some of them graduated from high school in June, some worked for a year or two after high school, a few worked for several years.
Marines get safety briefs before they go on leave or liberty to remind them that they are valuable to their units and to encourage them not to do things that will result in injury or brig/jail time. For special liberty periods (three- or four-day weekends, days off in the middle of the week, etc.), they will typically get more extensive or varied safety briefs. We've had many of these special liberty periods lately, and some time in the past couple months, the Marines got a brief from our Substance Abuse Control Officer (SACO). In this brief, he told them, among other things, about some new ways that Marines have been getting high lately, and added that the Marine Corps couldn't test for them.
Well, guess what? There was an inspection in the barracks this past Thursday night, and they found drug paraphernalia as well as raw materials to do exactly what the SACO told them. An entire class of 20-30 enlisted Marines was implicated. They're obviously all in a whole boatload of trouble right now, and it's an embarrassment to my company, but as someone that is not involved in the situation, I have the luxury of stepping back to ask my questions.
First of all, given the magnitude of the wrong-doing, what mix of discipline and punishment is appropriate? (The object of discipline being a modification of behavior, the object of punishment being to deter others from making the same mistake.)
More importantly, what could have been done to prevent something like this? (Aside from the obvious: don't give them "safety briefs" telling them new ways to get high. But they can come up with this stuff on their own, too.) It's likely that this was started by two or three Marines that drew the rest of the class in. All it would have taken to severely limit or completely shut them down would have been one Marine that had the courage to tell them they were wrong and to report them if they didn't stop.
Where did we fail the Marines? Moral leadership is part of our profession; where was that breakdown? Additional safety briefs likely wouldn't have made a difference, but on some level they didn't receive the moral leadership they needed. Given the circumstances of how and when they get here, it's possible that there's nothing we could have done to prevent this. But if there was, what signs did we miss that indicated that something needed to be done?
It's unlikely I'll run into a problem of this magnitude in the operating forces, as regular platoons have NCO leadership to stem problems like this. But I've heard multiple other first-hand stories with similar wrong-doing and implications. How can I impress upon my Marines the importance of upright character and moral courage?
This is the heart of what it means to lead Marines: asking what are my Marines' deficiencies? Professional? Physical? Moral? Then helping them become better Marines, better people.
Yesterday, as I was walking out of class, a bunch of Marines were lined up in the hall, waiting to talk to the First Sergeant. They knew that I knew why they were there, but one of them didn't forget that she was a Marine: she gave me the proper greeting of the day as I passed.
They make mistakes, but they're still Marines, and they're still our Marines. Hopefully the rest of them will remember that, too.
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